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SYSTEM-GENERATED DIGITAL FORENSIC
EVIDENCE IN GRAPHIC DESIGN
APPLICATIONS
Enos Mabuto
and
Hein Venter
University of Pretoria
South Africa
ABSTRACT
Graphic design applications are often used for the editing and design of digital
art. The same applications can be used for creating counterfeit documents such
as identity documents (IDs), driver’s licences, passports, etc. However, the use
of any graphic design application leaves behind traces of digital information
that can be used during a digital forensic investigation. Current digital forensic
tools examine a system to find digital evidence, but they do not examine a
system specifically for the creating of counterfeit documents created through
the use of graphic design applications.
The paper in hand reviews the system-generated digital forensic evidence
gathered from certain graphic design applications, which indicates that a
counterfeit document was created. This inference is made by associating the
digital forensic information gathered with the possible actions taken, more
specifically, the scanning, editing, saving and printing of counterfeit
documents. The digital forensic information is gathered by analysing the files
generated by the particular graphic design application used for creating the
document. The acquired digital forensic information is corroborated to the
creation of counterfeit documents and interpreted accordingly. In the end
determining if a system was utilised for counterfeiting.
Keywords: Digital evidence, Digital forensic, Digital forensic artifacts,
Graphic design applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
Industries including but not limited to advertising, newspaper printing,
architecture, fashion and design, project management and manufacturing make
use of graphic designs for their corporations. Graphic design applications have
enhancing tools like paint brushing, vector drawing, digital pen and pencil
drawing, and many more. These graphic design applications are used to
facilitate the creation of unique art for company logos, magazine advertising or
computer-aided design, to mention but a few. Most industries make use of
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graphic design applications for visual presentations and use pictorial
expressions that aid communication and the expression of ideas.
Forged or counterfeit documents are, however, encountered and in circulation
all over the world. The same graphic design applications used in modern
industry can also be used for illegitimate purposes like creating counterfeit
documents. Due to the exceptional editing and design capabilities of these
applications they can easily be exploited and misused to create counterfeit
documents like IDs, passports or drivers licences. According to a newspaper
report by Ilham Rawoot of the Mail & Guardian, terrorist’s target fake South
African passports because of the ease with which they can be faked. Criminal
activities such as these confirm the need for digital forensic investigations.
Similar digital forensic papers have been published that identify image forgery
or tampered images. However, not much has been done in such research to
identify whether a specific system was used during a counterfeiting exercise.
Therefore, if no evidence is available for proving that a counterfeited document
exists, counterfeiting criminals can potentially get away with it. It is, thus,
relevant to examine a system specifically for the potential existence of
counterfeit documents.
The use of graphic design applications leaves behind traces that can be
revealed during a digital forensic investigation. A digital forensic investigation
generally consists of the following phases consisting of the acquisition,
examination, analysis and reporting (U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2001).
Assuming that an individual is suspected of creating counterfeit documents, the
regular process of acquisition is followed. The phases of acquisition and
reporting are generally similar in different cases; hence the emphasis is on the
examination and analysis phases.
This paper identifies the digital traces left behind when certain graphic design
applications had been used. This is achieved by associating the possible actions
taken during document creation with the traces left behind. The source of
potential evidence referred to above equates to the results of possible actions
(i.e., document scanning, editing, saving and printing) taken during document
creation. Most of this evidence would originate from the application log files,
referred to as system-generated evidence.
The work covered in this paper continues from previously-published work by
the authors on “User-generated digital forensic evidence from graphic design
applications”. The mentioned paper elaborates on gathering potential evidence
on the actual files with counterfeit value created by the counterfeiter
intentionally. As opposed to the previous paper, the focus of this paper is on
the files generated by the graphic design application itself, mostly for the
purpose of metadata that would hold potential evidence. Another similar paper
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published by the authors titled “Finding digital evidence from graphic design
applications”, presented digital evidence on a high level.
To address the problem, the authors focus on identifying the digital forensic
information that shows whether a document was created through the mentioned
four actions. In doing so, a link with the potential criminal may be established.
However, it is not the aim of this paper to link the crime to an actual person but
merely to establish that a counterfeit document was indeed created.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two starts off with
some background on digital forensics, followed by a brief discussion on
graphic design applications. Section three presents the system-generated digital
forensic evidence gathered by means of two experiments, while Section four is
an evaluation and discussion of the evidence extracted from the graphic design
applications. Section five serves as conclusion to this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In Part A, the authors discuss the studied literature on digital forensics,
followed by an explanation of digital evidence and a definition of digital
forensic artifacts. Part B contains a brief discussion of the three Adobe graphic
design applications used for the purposes of this study.
2.1 Digital Forensics
At the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, digital
forensics was defined as the use of scientifically derived and proven methods
toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis,
interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence derived from
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of
events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorised actions
shown to be disruptive to planned operations. To reconstruct and understand
what happened on a system in the past, data has to be gathered and analysed in
a transparent manner.
A digital forensic investigation focuses on finding digital evidence when a
computer or network security incident has occurred, or locating data from
systems that may form part of some litigation, even if such data has been
deleted. In this context, evidence is critical and any items that can be
considered to be of evidential value should be identified and collected (Jones
and Valli, 2008). Computer evidence or digital evidence is defined as any
hardware, software or data that can be used to prove one or more of the ‘who,
what, when, where, why and how’ questions pertaining to a security incident
(Solomon, Barrett, and Broom, 2005). Computer evidence furthermore consists
of digital files and their contents that are left behind after an incident. Casey
defined digital evidence as any data that can be used to establish that a crime
was committed or that can prove a link between a crime and its victim or an
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offender. Digital evidence consists entirely of sequences of binary values
called bits (Cohan, 2010). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the
evidence should be presented in its logical form in court or at a disciplinary
hearing.
Traces left behind from the use of an application or operating systems are
referred to as digital forensic artifacts (Altheide and Carvey, 2011). An
examiner reveals the truth of an event by discovering and exposing the
remnants of the event that have been left on the system. Because of the loaded
legal connotations binding the term ‘evidence’, the term ‘artifacts’ is preferably
used instead to refer to these remnants. When a perpetrator tries to remove
these artifacts, it potentially leaves other artifacts behind. For example, in
trying to remove log files from a system, one typically might use a removal
tool, which leaves additional traces indicating that a log removal tool was used.
The scattered evidence inside a system can indicate what has happened for a
particular digital forensic investigation.
Application artifacts left by installed applications can be an excellent source of
potential evidence when performing an analysis. An artifact, however, does not
become evidence unless its ability to prove a fact has been established
(Zelkowitz, 2009). Hence it is necessary to reconstruct events that occurred by
gathering all the possible digital information from a system.
The amount of research and development that has been undertaken in this field
has not, to date, focused on the skills and of graphic design software, which is
a particular area that is nearly always exploited for the purpose of creating
counterfeit documents and images. Most research work that has been
undertaken up till now has concentrated on image forensics, which is the kind
of investigation that is able to determine whether or not an image as been
forged or tempered.
Lien, proposed a method that uses a pre-calculated resampling weighting table
to detect periodic properties in error distribution within an image. The errors in
the distribution within an image are used to determine if the image has been
forged. Stamm proposed a method to detect contrast enhancement and addition
of noise in jpeg compression images. Changes in contrast and noise within an
image are determined through the use of an algorithm that calculates pixel
values within the image. The values are then used to detect forgery within the
image. Cohen proposed a method that determines characteristics associated
within digital still camera images to determine the origin of the image. The
characteristics are compared to the exact replicas and derivates of other
statistical images to detect forgery. These, and other related work focus on
determining forgery using statistical data within the image.
Very little of the research carried out to date has specifically investigated the
ways and means in which documents are counterfeited. These ways also
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include the methods and procedures that can be used to detect such activities
from graphic design applications, which is the focus of this paper.
How and where evidence is located differs, depending on the crime being
investigated, the platform (operating systems) and the application used to
commit the crime.
2.2 Graphic Design Applications
Of the many graphic design applications currently available in the industry,
Adobe Systems Incorporated is regarded as the largest software maker in the
graphic design software category (Bloomberg News, 2011) and hence the
reason for focussing on graphic design software from Adobe Systems for this
research. Adobe Systems Incorporated owns software technologies that are
used for online transactions, business applications and social technologies. The
case study for the current research was therefore conducted with Adobe
graphic design applications, namely Photoshop and In-Design.
3. DIGITAL FORENSIC EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM GRAPHIC
DESIGN APPLICATIONS
In this section, the authors start off by explaining the research method used in
this study to create the counterfeit documents, referred to as the experiments.
Secondly the authors illustrate the results obtained from the experiments,
referred to as the gathered digital forensic artifacts. A summary elaborating on
the results concludes this section.
3.1 Experiments
‘System-generated digital forensic artifacts’ refer to those artifacts created by
the application without direct user intervention, while ‘user-generated digital
forensic artifacts’ refer to artifacts intentionally and directly created by the
user. The latter are not analysed in this paper.
The research experiments were conducted in two stages. The first experiment
was conducted to simulate the activities that can be performed by an offender
and is referred to as the 'counterfeiter experiment'. The second experiment was
carried out to trace the activities of the offender and is referred to as the
'investigator experiment'. An explanation of the two experiments follows.
3.1.1 Counterfeiter Experiment: Creating the Counterfeit Documents
The researcher created approximately three hundred dummy counterfeit
documents by using the graphic design applications that were discussed earlier
in this text. The motivation behind the creation of approximately three hundred
documents is as follows. These documents were created during the experiment
by editing the following four components within a South African Identity
Document (ID), passport and drivers license: the barcode, fingerprints,
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signatures, and photographs of human faces. This required a combination of
twenty four options (4! (Factorial)= 24) on eleven examined file types. The
combination for all file types equalled two hundred and sixty four (24 x 11),
and included a few extra repetitions for clarity, yielding almost three hundred
documents. This was so that the authors could be able to notice the difference
or the changes to the digital forensic artifacts as more documents are created.
Different application versions usually bring about more application capabilities
and enhanced digital tools which can result in potential changes to digital
forensic artifacts. These changes will be explained later in the results section.
Since most graphic design application users prefer the latest editions, the most
recent version of Adobe, CS5, was used for this study as the base experiment.
Further experiments were carried out on CS3 and CS4 for comparative
purposes. Three different computers were used, each with a different Adobe
version installed on it. The counterfeit documents were created by performing
the actions mentioned before (scanning, editing, saving and printing). The
‘platform’ refers to the operating system on which the counterfeit documents
were created. According to software reviews in 2011, the Windows operating
system is still ranked most popular and the analysis of digital forensic artifacts
was consequently conducted on a Windows 7 platform.
3.1.2 Investigator Experiment: Searching for the Evidence
Once the counterfeit documents had been created, experiments were carried out
to search for pertinent evidence left behind from the use of the graphic design
applications. The operating systems’ registry editor tool, ‘regedit’ was used to
search for associated registry entries, while a hex editor, Winhex was used for
analysing the binary data of the log files.
To respond to the problem stated earlier, that there are no digital forensic
investigation software tools available yet to investigate crimes where graphic
design applications can be used for creating counterfeit documents; four
possible actions taken during the creation of a document were used as a
hypothesis to gather digital forensic information related to the graphic design
applications. The analysis is formulated to find the digital forensic information
that indicates that the actions (scanning, editing, saving and printing) had
indeed taken place. By tracking the actions performed, an investigator is able
to conduct a systematic investigation aimed at acquiring not only the files used
to create the document, but also the actual documents created to be used as
potential evidence. For example, if the document was scanned, then the next
step would probably be that it was edited. If never scanned then probably it
was edited only. In the end, it becomes possible to state if the document
created was a counterfeit document or not.
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If none of the four actions were taken, then there is no need to ascertain
whether the application was used for document creation. An illustration of the
results from the experiments follows.
3.2 Results from the Experiments: Gathered Digital Forensic Artifacts
The discussion that follows highlights the digital forensic artifacts found in
graphic design applications where the source of the potential evidence is
mainly system-generated and results derive mostly from application log files.
Experimental results obtained from digital forensic artifacts related to the four
actions (scan, edit, save and print) are elaborated on in each of the subsections
to follow.
3.2.1 Artifacts Related to Document Scanning
Generally, when one attempts to create a fraudulent document, an original
document has to be acquired to imitate or copy its identity. Scanning is a
common option that results in the original document being available on
computer for digital editing. The different models of scanners that are currently
available use various software packages for executing scan commands. For the
purposes of this research, the focus is therefore on commands generated from
within the graphic design application and used for editing the scanned
document.
Adobe Photoshop has the capability to scan a document using the ‘import WIA
support’ document menu option. The document scanned is loaded into a
destination folder as prompted. The application creates a folder, saves the
scanned image and opens the scanned image in the application.
After a document is scanned, the application records the digital artifact
(evidence for scanning) into one of its log files named Adobe Photoshop CSX
Prefs.psp located in C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Adobe\Adobe
Photoshop CSX\Adobe Photoshop CSX Settings. The X in CSX represents the
version of the graphic design application, which can be 3, 4 or 5. After the
authors analysed this psp log file, they identified an entry recorded of the
location of the scanned file at certain address offsets to be discussed in the
Section 3.3 summary. Through examining this location, the authors were able
to identify the copies of the original documents scanned for possible
counterfeiting.
Adobe In-Design is not capable of scanning a document. In this case, if the
application used cannot scan a document. Then the user could use the scanners
own software, this means that the scanned document will be loaded into the
application through the “place” function. As long as the application user has
inserted the scanned document into the graphic design application, it is
possible to trace the particular image inserted as shall be described in the sub
section “artifacts related to document editing”. Even if not all actions are
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exercised(scan, edit, save and print), the traces obtained from any recognised
actions are used to determine, for example what was inserted in the document
and what the saved document created is. This would enable an investigator to
visualise these aspects and determine if a counterfeit document was created.
After scanning, the regular process followed by a potential criminal is to edit
the acquired document in a bid to falsify its content. This editing process is
discussed in the next section.
3.2.2 Artifacts Related to Document Editing
Document editing is one of the important stages of creating a counterfeit
document as it allows one to insert objects of interest. For example, a human
face, a bar code or a fingerprint can be inserted in the scanned document. A
number of editing actions can be performed, including typing, colouring or
drawing. Our focus is on editing by insertion of an image or object, as this can
later be used to determine if the document created was counterfeit or not.
Regarding inserted objects, experiments were executed to establish what can be
inferred from a system that indicates to the examiner what was inserted and
from which location it was inserted. The terms ‘inserting’, ‘attaching’ or
‘placing’ an image are considered to refer to the same action, though called
differently in various applications. In this paper, the term ‘inserting’ is used
henceforth.
The same log file, Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, records digital information
with the name of the inserted file and the location from which it was
inserted.
Adobe In-Design can also perform the action of inserting an image into a
document. In-Design log files consist of FindChangeData, FontMaskCache,
In_DesignDragDrop and idletask. This application records digital artifacts for
editing entries into one of its log files. The log file named InDesign SavedData
(without a file extension), which is located at C:\Users\ <username>\
AppData\Local\Adobe\ InDesign\Version 5.0\Cache, contains the information
that indicates the name of the location from which an image was inserted.
Unlike Adobe Photoshop, Adobe In-Design only records the folder location
or the path of the inserted images, and not the full name of the inserted
image.
From these locations, the authors were able to obtain the actual images used
during document editing, for example, images of a human face and fingerprint
images. These images are essentially necessary for counterfeit investigations as
they can be used for compare to the images within the suspect counterfeit
document.
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3.2.3 Artifacts Related to Document Saving
Once a document has been edited, the user (or potential criminal) usually needs
to save it either for later printing or further editing. In this section the authors
examine what is found in the system relating to saved documents. This
information is vital as it can point to an examiner the name of the potentially
fraudulent saved file and where the file was saved to. If the file was deleted or
moved, search commands can also be generated based on the names of the files
saved. This is done by specifying the name of the file when searching, thereby
extending the search filter or search domain during an investigation.
Adobe Photoshop log file records the digital artifacts that indicate saving
entries. The same log file, Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, contains information
about the name, location and type of the saved file.
The log file InDesign SavedData contains information about the name and
type of the file that has been saved, as well as the location to which the file
was saved.
In both cases, the names are arranged in order of the last saved file first. From
this information the authors managed to obtain the documents created by the
graphic design application and recognise the ones which are counterfeit
documents.
Adobe Photoshop records both the name of the ‘saving folder’ location and the
full name of the saved file. The name of the ‘saving folder’ is recorded in the
beginning of the log file, while the entry with the names of the saved files
appears towards the middle of the log file. It is noted that the log file records a
maximum of 22 entries of saved files. As more files are saved, the log file
overwrites the older entries with new entries. Adobe In-Design records an
unlimited number of saved documents.
The digital artifacts for saved documents can be verified or compared to the
registry entries. Values for the visited directories are acquired from the registry
key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\
Software
\Adobe\Photoshop\<version
#>\VisitedDirs. Generally, saved files from any graphic design application can
also be verified or checked by looking at recent documents available in folder
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\ Microsoft\Windows\Recent.
3.2.4 Artifacts Related to Document Printing
Printing is one of the last stages of counterfeit document creation. A user might
need to create a hard copy of the edited document so that it can be used in a
physical environment. Unlike scanning actions, printing actions can be
commanded from all the graphic design applications in question via the print
menu command. The artifacts illustrated in this section are valid for any of the
examined graphic design applications. To locate which printer(s) are used to
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print a document, one uses the registry entries below. The registry keys from
which a list of printer connections can be established are the following:
(1)HKLM\soft\Adobe\Photoshop\11.0\Plugin path.
(2) HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Prin
ters
(3) HKEY_USERS\\<username>\\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVer
sion\PrinterPorts (4) HKEY_USERS\<username>\Software\Microsoft\
Installer\Products\<productid>\SourceList
After establishing the names of the printers from the above, the physical
existence of the printers can be verified. This usually assists an investigator in
cases where the actual printers have been removed. Physical printers are
necessary in an investigation so as to match the digital evidence to the actual
printer for supporting a case during court proceedings.
For each print job, two spool files are generated by the operating system
located in C:\Windows\System32\spool\ PRINTERS. The first is XXXXX.shd
and the second is XXXXX.spl, where XXXXX represents the job number in
decimal format. Analysing the binary data of these files indicates the name of
the spooled document. Additionally, print jobs that were queued to print but
have not actually been printed yet can also be found within print spools. Table
1 shows the recognised printing artifacts including examples.
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Table 1 Address Offsets for Printed Documents

Recognised
printing
artifact

Spool file
containing
artifact

Address
offset for
recognised
artifact (in
HEX)

Example

Name of
printed
document

spl

0X20

Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd

Name of
printer

shd

0X88

HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL

Name of
printer
(repeat)

shd

0X3B0

HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL

Name of the
application
that
generated
the print
request

shd

0X2120

Adobe Photoshop CS5

Username
and name of
file

shd

0X2400

Robert_graphics_editor.
Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd

The column and row headings for Table 1 are briefly explained for the sake of
clarity. Recognised printing artifact is the name of the digital artifact obtained
from the stated print spool file (column Spool file containing artifact). Address
offset for recognised artifact represents the address pointer in hexadecimal
format for the digital artifact, pointing to the named artifact contained in the
spool file. Example is an example of a digital artifact for the recognised
printing artifact. Name of printer is the address offset where an entry of the
name of the printer that generated the print job can be found, and this entry is
repeated at another place in the shd spool file as shown in the second column
Name of printer (repeat). The reason for this repetition is not known, however,
as far as digital forensic evidence is concerned, the repetition merely confirms
again that the printer that was indeed used. Name of the application that
generated the print request is the offset of the name of the application that
generated the print job. Username and name of file is the address offset of the
name of the user that generated the print job and the name of the printed
potential counterfeit document (evidence for printing).
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3.3 Summary
A log file may consist of thousands of pages of binary data, of which only
a few pages will contain the required digital forensic artifacts, which, in
addition, may be scattered throughout these few pages. Figure 1 shows an
example of an Adobe log file, indicating a path recognised for scanned
documents.
One can use a hex editor to scroll, for example, approximately 60% down the
log file consisting of thousands of pages to reveal the evidence that is required.
This can result in wasting too much time and, ultimately, running the risk that
critical evidence being omitted from the search.

Figure 1 Graphic Design Application Log File Containing 16980 Pages

Another reason for recognising the locations of digital forensic information is
that the digital forensic artifacts from the log files do not make use of evidence
identifiers such as prefixes and tags. (Evidence identifiers are discussed in the
previously mentioned paper by the authors) In other words, the investigator
does not know what to search for using keyword searching. The chart
presented in this section guide the investigator to look for this evidence at a
pre-determined location, for example, about six tenths (or three fifths) down
the file. It is therefore necessary to identify the location of this information
by making use of radar chart in order to pinpoint where the evidence can be
found within the log file. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the digital
forensic artifacts within the Photoshop psp log file.
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Photoshop log
file digital
forensic artifacts
distribution

CS3 Edit &
Scan
CS4 Edit &
Scan
CS5 Edit &
Scan
CS3 save

0 - 50 ...# of Documents
created

Figure 2 A Graphic Illustration of Digital Artifacts
Distribution in a Photoshop Log File

The chart in Figure 2 shows that the digital forensic artifacts are located mostly
in the middle of the log file for any action. In this chart, the centre represents
the beginning of the log file represented by a 0 and the outer edges represent
the end of the log file represented by a 1. The numbers one to fifty represent
the number of counterfeit documents created. Such a chart helps the examiner
to appreciate that they can access most of the information at the same location
inside a log file. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of digital forensic artifacts
within the log file, Indesign Save data.

Figure 3 A Graphic Illustration of Digital Artifacts
Distribution in an Adobe In-Design Log File
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The radar chart (figure 3) shows that most digital forensic artifacts from the
Adobe In-Design log file are located towards the end of the file. Some,
however, are scattered all over the file from the beginning until the end. It can
be recognised that the radar charts do not contain printing distribution; this is
because the printing artifacts outlined in Section 3.2.4 are fixed address offsets
as displayed in Table 1.
Based on the experiments conducted in this study, the authors managed to
establish the locations to which scanned documents were saved. In these
locations one could discover several other counterfeit documents that were
scanned. In respect of the action of editing, the authors established the names,
file types and file locations of inserted objects. By tracking the latter, the actual
insertions were recognised by means of fingerprints and human face images
inserted into the counterfeit documents. The saving action enabled the
researchers to recognise potential digital evidence that reveal the location of
the actual counterfeit documents created. The printing action exposed registry
and spool files that revealed the names of the printers that had been used for
document printing, as well as the names of those documents printed.
4. DISCUSSION
Given that a digital forensic investigation was initiated into a suspected
counterfeit document creation crime, and given that the document was
generated using a graphic design application, a digital forensic examiner can
use the identified digital forensic artifacts to establish the route along which the
document was created and corroborate the gathered evidence. For example, the
digital forensic examiner is able to discover the human face, fingerprint, and/or
bar code images that were used to create the counterfeit document. The
inserted image can then be compared to match the image in the suspected
counterfeit document. Such evidence can be presented in a court of law for
prosecution. Presenting proof of the actions taken during the process of
document tampering (scanning, editing, saving and printing) provides valuable
support when a case of counterfeit document creation is brought before the
court as evidence indicating how the document was created and what entities
were used to create the document. In the end, determining if the system was
used for counterfeiting purposes.
These results are essential for a digital forensic examiner to find and locate
digital evidence related to the creation of counterfeit documents. This increases
the transparency and reliability of the investigation process in cases where the
crime tool was a graphic design application.
5. CONCLUSION
As mentioned before, that previously-published work, i.e., user-generated
digital forensic evidence in graphic design applications, involves detecting a
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counterfeit document directly created by the user. That research lead to another
question whether there exist system-generated evidence indirectly created by a
system rather than directly created by a user, which then led to this paper,
which identifies if a system was used for counterfeiting purposes.
The gathering of system-generated digital forensic evidence is effective in
addressing cases where counterfeit document editing is largely associated with
particular graphic design applications. Although this approach addresses only
case studies involving Adobe products, the same can be done for other graphic
design applications and for many other types of applications. A shortcoming of
the approach is, however, that it does not tackle issues where the user only
edits a hard copy, or scans and prints without using any pre-installed graphic
design application. Another drawback of this approach is the fact that this
exercise needs to be carried out on all new graphic design applications in order
to detect where exactly potential evidence can be found within such a new
graphic design application.
The techniques discussed in this paper can, however, be incorporated in
commercial digital forensic tools like FTK or Encase, or it can possibly be
used in the design of a new digital forensic investigation tool capable of
specifically detecting counterfeit document creation. For example, a tool can be
created similar to the ‘porn detection stick’ created by Paraben, which is a
thumb drive device that scans and detects pornographic content on a computer.
Future research can include administering this process to other graphic design
applications such as CorelDraw and also to other types of applications that
could similarly be used to commit digital document fraud.
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